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 TARGETING HEDGE FUNDS AND ‘REPO RUNS’ 
Hedge Funds And ‘Repo Runs’.docx  
Harry McVea 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter  explores the role of hedge funds in the context of evolving market developments in credit 
intermediation, in particular, with regard to sale and repurchase transactions (so-called “repos”) —an 
important and increasingly high profile facet of the shadow banking universe. More pertinently, it seeks to 
critically analyze the ways in which hedge funds can trigger and, in turn, help to transmit systemic risks in 
the context of repo transactions. In doing so, the chapter aims to challenge long-maintained claims—both 
from within the hedge fund sector itself, and amongst certain sections of the academic community—which 
downplay, or even dismiss, concerns relating to the capacity of hedge funds to cause significant disruption 
to the wider financial system. The validity or otherwise of these claims has a bearing on the ongoing 
debate with regard to the need for additional regulatory oversight of hedge fund activities, both in the 
context of repo transactions and, indeed, more generally.   
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets out to explore the role of hedge funds in the context of sale and repurchase 
agreements (so-called “repos”)—an important and increasingly high-profile facet of the shadow 
banking universe.1 In this respect, the focus is on bilateral repos—that is, repo transactions 
which are negotiated and settled directly between two counterparties without the use of a 
“triparty agent”.2 Hedge funds are major players in such repos3 and these markets are widely 
regarded as being opaque.4  More pertinently, the chapter seeks to critically analyse the ways in 
which, within the context of repo transactions, hedge funds may trigger and, in turn, transmit 
“systemic risk”5 by way of a so-called “repo run”6—either within the shadow banking system 
                                                          
1 It is estimated that the size of the global repo market is in the region of €15-20 trillion. Richard Comotto,  A 
Supplementary Note on the Systemic Importance of Collateral and the Role of the Repo Market (ICMA’s European 
Repo Council, 7 May, 2013) (at para 4.8). 
2 A triparty agent’s role—in Europe at any rate—is limited to collateral management. Richard Comotto, A Primer on 
Tri-party Repo(ICMA) (http://www.icmagroup.org/executive-education/courses/the-icma-guide-to-best-practice-in-
the-european-repo-market/a-primer-on-tri-party-repo/). 
3 “[B]ilateral repo is the home of hedge funds” Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “Who Ran on Repo?” (4 October, 
2012) (at 1) (http://faculty.som.yale.edu/garygorton/documents/whorancompleteoctober4.pdf). 
4 “[L]arge segments of the repo market remain opaque today. In fact, at present there is no way that regulators or 
market participants can precisely determine even the overall volume of bilateral repo transactions”: Governor Daniel 
K Tarullo, “Shadow Banking After the Financial Crisis” (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on 
Challenges in Global Finance: The Role of Asia, San Francisco, California (12 June, 2012) (at p 11) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120612a.htm). 
5 Systemic risk refers to the risk of a severe dislocation of the entire financial network resulting from the collateral 
damage spawned by the collapse of a single “too-big-to-fail” institution or a single sector in the broader network. 
The term conjures up the idea of “cascading failure in the financial sector, caused by interlinkages within the 
financial system”: LSE, Systemic Risk Centre (http://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/systemic-risk#sthash.rutIVf4u.dpuf). 
6 The term is widely associated with Gorton and Metrick’s seminal work on shadow banking more generally: see, eg 
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System” (2010) Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 261 (referring to “run on repo”). In fact, a number of studies now support the contention that a 
“repo run” was an important component of the GFC. See, eg, Gorton and  Metrick. “Securitized banking and the run 
on repo” (2012) 104(3) Journal of Financial Economics 425; and Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin, and Michael 
Walker, “Repo run: evidence from the tri-party repo market.” (2011) (No. 506, Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank 
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itself, or, in ways which adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the traditional banking sector. In 
doing so, it sets out to challenge long-maintained claims that hedge funds do not pose serious 
risks to financial stability,7 and to take issue with an enduring body of opinion—prevalent 
amongst certain sections of the academic community and within the hedge fund sector itself,8—
which seeks to downplay, or even dismiss, concerns about the capacity of such funds to cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system. As leading US scholar, Jonathan Macey has 
claimed:9 
“Arguments in favour of increased hedge fund regulation in order to lower systemic risk 
are flat wrong. Such arguments [fail] to consider that hedge funds pose no systemic risk 
because of the incredible diversity in their investment strategies, an assertion bolstered by 
evidence from decades of experience with hedge funds.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of New York). However, see, Benjamin Munyan, “Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets” (Office of Financial 
Research Working Paper, 29 October, 2015) (arguing that runs were perhaps only the symptom of more general 
develeraging rather than a run on repo and that more evidence is needed) (at p 45). 
7 “The evidence on hedge funds … is that they do not pose a systemic risk to stability; hence their regulation may be 
expected to differ significantly from that applied to banks.” Dan Walters, “Hedge Funds and Private Equity” 
(Speech by Director of Retail Policy and Themes and Sector Leader, Asset Management, FSA, April, 2008). 
8 Todd Groome (Alternative Investment Managers Association (AIMA)), “Hedge funds should contribute to 
stability”, Financial Times, 31 January 2010 (“Hedge funds are not systemically ‘important’ institutions, based on 
the risk they pose to the financial system”); Jack Inglis (AIMA), “Hedge funds do not pose a systemic risk” 
Financial News, 7 April 2014 (“The FCA data [in their 2014 Hedge Fund Survey] supports the thesis that, today, no 
individual hedge fund or manager is systemically important to the extent that its failure would endanger financial 
stability in Europe or globally”); Andrew Baker (AIMA) ), “Hedge funds are not ‘shadow banks’”, Financial Times, 
15 May 2011 (“[While] it is possible that individual hedge funds could act together to create systemic impacts …. 
the hedge fund industry’s heterogeneous and proudly contrarian nature makes such unified action highly unlikely. 
The truth is that systemic risk continues to reside in ‘too big to fail’ institutions. Hedge funds …. are, as independent 
academics have noted, rigorously regulated, transparent to their supervisors, not systemic, and ‘small enough to 
fail’”); and the Managed Funds Association (MFA) (“[hedge funds ] aren’t susceptible to runs”) 
(https://www.managedfunds.org/hedge-fund-investors/myth-vs-fact/). 
9 Jonathan R Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University press, 2010) 
(“Arguments in favour of increased hedge fund regulation in order to lower systemic risk are flat wrong. Such 
arguments failed to consider the hedge funds pose no systemic risk because of the incredible diversity in their 
investment strategies, an assertion bolstered by evidence from decades of experience with hedge funds.” (p 268)). 
See also, Houman B Shadab, “The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation” (2007) 30(1) Regulation 36 (“Worries 
about market failure from contagion are mostly hypothetical. Few academic studies of hedge funds directly address 
systemic risk, and none conclude that the threat is large or even offer a definitive measure or assessment.”) (at p 39). 
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Furthermore, as the Managed Funds Association (MFA), which represents the global alternative 
investment industry and its investors, has argued:10 
“[W]hile hedge funds do liquidate and wind up with some regularity, no hedge fund has 
ever been bailed-out by the government and hedge fund closures have generally not been 
identified as a primary source of instability during the financial crisis …. During the 
financial crisis, there were special government programs for banks, the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program and commercial paper guarantees, similar programs for insurance 
companies, and even direct guarantees of money market funds. However, … there was no 
government relief program for hedge funds for a simple reason – though hedge funds 
suffered investment losses and some closed, hedge funds were not a cause of systemic 
risk. Hedge funds wind up and merge routinely in transactions that do not disrupt the 
markets, much less create systemic risk.” 
Significantly, the above “narrative” is emblematic of the hedge fund industry’s aggressive 
approach towards the prospect of greater regulatory oversight of the sector more generally. In 
Europe, for example, the draft Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), 
which, post-global financial crisis (GFC), sought to establish a harmonised framework for the 
regulation and supervision of EU-based alternative investment fund managers (AIFM)—
including hedge fund managers—provoked a storm of criticism from many industry 
participants11 and supporters,12 and led to protracted discussions between the European 
                                                          
10 MFA Response to FSB and International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) second consultation 
paper on Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer Globally Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (29 May, 2015) 
(<www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/479/pdf/Managed%20Funds%20Association%20(MFA).pdf>) at p 7 (hereinafter 
MFA Response). 
11 The Hedge Fund Standards Board (HFSB)—a European based self-regulatory organization—criticised it for being 
“rushed” and “protectionist”; and as offering “significant scope for unintended consequences”: HFSB, The EU’s 
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Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament to reach a compromise 
solution.13  
More recently, attempts to designate certain asset managers—including certain hedge 
fund managers—as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) (along with the 
inevitable additional regulation that such a designation would have entailed) have provoked a 
similarly trenchant response. In this respect, the MFA has claimed that concerns about “forced 
asset sales” are “misplaced”,14 and that direct regulation of hedge funds by, for example, the 
Dodd-Frank Act (in the US) and the AIFMD (in the EU), coupled with indirect regulation of 
hedge fund counterparties already serve to mitigate any adverse impact that hedge fund activity 
might have on the financial system.15 More generally, the sector suffers from a long-standing 
tendency to portray itself as having been “wrongly targeted as universal scapegoats” for more 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Draft Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Observations from the Hedge Fund Standards 
Board’s Perspective (June 2009) (http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/system/files/AIFM%20Directive-Deinet.pdf).  
12 For example, George Osborne, then Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, UK Conservative Party, described it as 
being “ill-conceived” and “badly drafted”: Financial Times interview (10 July, 2009).  
13 Even after this compromise, the Directive was still wildly criticized for being “disproportionate” (see: Eilís 
Ferran, “After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU” (2011) 12 European 
Business Organization Law Review 379(“Given that [the Directive] is to apply only to a relatively small part of 
financial market activity, it has a disproportionate feel, implying that it could be the proverbial “sledgehammer to 
crack a nut” at p 410); and Phillip Inman, “City welcomes signs of EU thaw on private equity regulation” (29 June, 
2009) (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/29/private-equity-regulation-eu-ec) (quoting Sir James 
Sassoon, Advisor to the UK’s Conservative Party on Financial Regulation), and, even, politically motivated 
(Financial Times Editorial (5 July, 2009) (“These are bad measures, politically motivated”). 
14 MFA Response, supra n 10, at p 3. 
15 “[R]egulations implemented and market practices adopted since the financial crisis … mitigate the risk that the 
liquidation of assets held by one or more hedge funds, even in periods of market stress, could have widespread 
impact on the financial system or cause any significant harm to a hedge fund’s counterparties …. These regulations, 
both direct and indirect, … have had a substantial impact on hedge funds and their managers because banks, broker 
dealers, swap dealers and other hedge fund counterparties have changed their business practices in order to comply 
with the new rules.”: Ibid., at p 3-4. 
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deep-seated weaknesses within the financial system,16 and to claim that much of the interest in 
and existing regulation of the sector is in fact politically motivated.17 
Yet, notwithstanding the industry’s recent—albeit perhaps only temporary—success in 
warding off SIFI designation, continued interest in, and close scrutiny of, the hedge fund sector 
is unlikely to abate any time soon. Indeed, as I seek to show below, in the context of repo 
activity, much of this attention is wholly merited. Specifically, it is argued that hedge fund 
involvement in repo transactions can, because of market incentives and short-term decision-
making amongst the relevant parties, result in outcomes in which private and public interests are 
seriously misaligned. More worryingly, this state of affairs can trigger so-called “repo runs”, 
which, in view of acute interconnections and interdependencies within modern global markets, 
can potentially require the use of public funds to provide liquidity support to certain systemically 
important entities—or for the purposes of reviving confidence more generally. Though 
individual hedge funds do not receive this support directly, it is suggested that the hedge fund 
sector nevertheless benefits indirectly from any that has been (or is) provided. 
In exploring the role which hedge funds play in propagating repo runs, the focus is 
largely, albeit not solely, on the European repo market, and the material is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides an overview of the shift from the traditional “originate and hold” model of 
banking towards a new “securitized” or market-based model, which has served to displace the 
central role formerly occupied by banks in credit intermediation. Section 3 focuses on hedge 
                                                          
16 Andrew Baker (AIMA), “A Time for Clear Thinking” (HEDGE magazine, April 2009); and Florence Lombard 
(AIMA), “Don’t blame hedge funds for world’s woes” (Financial Times, 2 May 2010). 
17 See, for example, Paul Marshall, “Europe’s Classic Exercise in Defending its Interests” (Financial Times, 18 May 
2009); and Dermot S L Butler, “Regulation Swings “Like a Pendulum Do” (9 December 2013) 
(http://www.customhousegroup.com/blog/2013/12/09/regulation-swings-like-a-pendulum-do-with-apologies-to-
roger-whittaker/). 
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funds as entities that have become increasingly active, important, and visible players within the 
“shadow banking” sector, and, in particular, on the role that these funds play in relation to 
bilateral repo agreements. Section 4 explores enduring regulatory concerns about systemic 
vulnerabilities within the global financial system, and explores how the added complexities and 
interconnections associated with disintermediation—particularly in relation to collateralized repo 
agreements and the associated risk of a “repo run”—accentuates these concerns. In the 
concluding Section (Section 5), the threads of the discussion are pulled together.   
 
B. SHADOW BANKING/FINANCIAL “DISINTERMEDIATION” 
 
B.1. The Traditional Role of Banks in the Credit Intermediation Process  
Traditionally, retail banks have played a central and distinctive role in helping to resolve one of 
the fundamental challenges which financial markets are designed to address: matching agents 
with capital in excess of their needs (eg savers) with agents in need of such capital (eg 
corporations, and other capital-starved but project-rich entities). Typically, retail savers are able 
to deposit only relatively small amounts of capital, yet value highly both liquidity, in the form of 
access to funds, and security, in the form of low or no risk.  By contrast, corporate borrowers 
generally seek to borrow large sums of money spread over a relatively long time frame—factors 
which concentrate risk and increase the likelihood of default on the loan. Acting as 
intermediaries, banks interpose themselves between these two groups so as to meet the respective 
needs and risk preferences of each. In this context, banks are said to utilize their superior 
information gathering and processing skills to screen and select ex ante suitable largescale fund 
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borrowers (and monitor them ex post), while simultaneously providing credit and liquidity 
services which are largely risk free to retail depositors.18 In doing so, banks perform the vital 
roles of size, maturity, liquidity, and credit risk transformation, all of which help to “service” the 
financing needs of the “real” economy.19 To the extent that these roles are impaired, socially 
desirable projects are likely to go unfunded and economic activity—and wealth—to contract. 
However, although such size, maturity, liquidity and credit risk transformations are 
almost universally regarded as affording major societal benefits, they are not without risk to the 
bank itself and, potentially, the financial system more generally.20 In view of the fact that banks 
“borrow short and lend long”, they are rendered uniquely vulnerable to market shocks. That is to 
say, since banks accept short term and very liquid deposits (which are available to savers on 
demand) and re-package these assets into long-term loans (hence creating assets which cannot be 
readily liquidated should the need arise), they are uniquely vulnerable to so-called “runs” 
whereby savers demand instant liquidity. What is more, in order to satisfy savers’ demands for 
cash, a bank may be forced to dispose of assets at panic driven “fire sale” prices, thus further 
exacerbating its search for liquid funds.21 The losses associated with a bank run rarely “lie where 
they fall”, but are instead apt to cross-infect or spill over to other healthy banks, as they, too, are 
embroiled in depositor runs and a search for liquidity. These losses are typically viewed as 
negative externalities, in that the social costs accompanying bank failures exceed their private 
                                                          
18 Put simply, banks seek to earn profits from the difference between the rate of interest charged on longer terms 
loans and the lower rate of interest paid out on deposits. 
19 See, Nicola Cetorelli, Benjamin H Mandel, and Lindsay Mollineaux, “The Evolution of Banks and Financial 
Intermediation: Framing the Analysis” FRBNY Economic Policy Review (July 2012). 
20 Turner Review, A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (Financial Services Authority (FSA), March 
2009) (hereinafter Turner Review): “[By] holding longer term assets than liabilities [banks] enabling the non-bank 
sector to hold shorter term assets than liabilities. This absorbs the risks arising from uncertainties in the cash flows 
of households and corporates, and results in a term structure of interest rates more favourable to long-term capital 
investment than would pertain if banks did not perform maturity transformation.” (at para 1.1). 
21 Charles A E Goodhart, “What is the Purpose of Regulating Financial Services?” mimeo (London School of 
Economics, 1986) at p 16 (on file with the author). 
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costs. And it is these externalities—these types of market failure—which, traditionally, have 
been regarded as providing a prima facie justification for regulatory intervention in the form of 
liquidity and capital adequacy requirements and lender of last resort facilities (for banks), and 
deposit protection (for depositors), in order to avert more widespread banking collapses. 
B.2. The Shift Towards More “Market Based” Credit Intermediation—So-called 
“Disintermediation” 
Interestingly and importantly, the central and distinctive role of retail banks in the credit 
intermediation process has changed over the years, and indications post GFC suggest that this 
shift is set to intensify. Over time, the traditional model of bank intermediation, where banks 
held loans to maturity (and where, as a result, credit risk was dangerously concentrated), has 
been increasingly rivalled by a “securitized” or more market-based model of credit 
intermediation—so-called “disintermediation”—which is strongly associated with an emergent 
shadow banking system.22 Though not regulated like banks, it is claimed that shadow banks, 
such as special-purpose vehicles, money-market funds, securities lenders, investment banks, and 
hedge funds, are connected along complex intermediation chains which involve the use of 
securitization vehicles, securities lending, and repos to provide important sources of finance for a 
wide range of financial institutions. These operations are said to be bank-like in that they result 
in size, liquidity, maturity, and credit risk transformations—but without the protections 
associated with traditional banking (eg onerous capital requirements and the lender of last resort 
facility for banks, and deposit insurance for fund suppliers). What is more, shadow banking is 
also said to be strongly associated with the “creation of assets that are thought to be safe, short-
                                                          
22 See supra n 2. 
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term, and liquid, and as such, ‘cash equivalents’ similar to insured deposits in the retail banking 
system.” 23 
Although in the wake of the GFC, regulators initially focused on retail banking issues,24 
attention has now turned towards shadow banking in general,25 and securities financing 
transactions (SFT) in particular.26 SFTs encompass a variety of secured transactions, amongst 
which securities lending and repo transactions are the most high profile. In essence, repos are 
collateralized loans which aim to provide a secure means of lending for cash lenders and 
leverage for borrowers. Although the size of the repo market has shrunk significantly from its 
peak of 2008,27 it is nevertheless estimated that, globally, it is in the region of €15-20 trillion.28 
In terms of its significance, repo markets thus represent a major source of wholesale funding for 
cash-starved entities and, moreover, are widely understood to play a pivotal role in the efficient 
workings of global financial markets more boradly.29  
Regulatory concerns have focused on the fact that repo transactions involve “bank-like” 
activities which give rise to maturity/liquidity transformations involving the short term financing 
                                                          
23 Tarullo, supra n 4, at p.1. 
24 At a global level, these efforts were primarily directed at Basel III reforms.  
25 At the “Seoul Summit” in November 2010, the G20 asked the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to undertake “work 
in mapping and exploring possible regulatory reform to reduce systemic risk and opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage in the shadow banking system” (“The Seoul summit document”, November 2010, Para. 41). For the start of 
this ongoing programme of work, see, FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation – 
Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (27 October, 2011). 
26 See, eg, FSB, Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues (Interim Report of 
the FSB Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos, 27 April 2012). Within the EU, the European Parliament 
recently adopted the European Commission’s Regulation on Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions 
(known as “SFTR”): (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5930_en.htm). 
27 Bloomberg, The Repo Market (http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-repo-market). 
28 Comotto,  supra n 1. 
29 In particular, repo markets play an important role in helping to distribute government securities and, more 
generally, in helping to “mobilise the wholesale capital funding required by [retail] banks and other lenders 
financing the real economy.” Comotto, ibid., at para 1.2.  
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of longer-term assets30—all outside the traditional banking system, under conditions where there 
is less transparency, significant inter-connectivity, less regulation, and no access to official 
liquidity support if assets backing the credit expansion become vulnerable, and, where investors 
are widely regarded as “well-informed, herd-like and fickle”.31 Significantly, bilateral repo 
markets—where the transaction is negotiated and settled directly between the two counterparties 
involved, and, where accordingly repo markets are at their least transparent—represent a primary 
source of funding for hedge funds.32 Set against this backdrop, the remainder of the chapter aims 
to explore the role of hedge funds with regard to repos, and to assess the extent to which hedge 
fund exposure to repo markets can trigger and, in turn, help transmit systemic risk. 
 
C. HEDGE FUNDS AND  REPO MARKETS 
 
C.1 What Are Hedge Funds? 
Although not straightforward to define, in essence hedge funds are a species of “alternative” 
private collective, or pooled, investment vehicle, and targeted in the main at relatively 
                                                          
30 FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow 
Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (August, 2013) at ii. 
31 Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, “Shadow Banking” Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff Reports (Staff Report no. 458, July 2010) at p 59. 
32 “Repo is particularly attractive to institutions that are already highly leveraged (eg securities firms and hedge 
funds), who would otherwise find it expensive and/or difficult to borrow additional funds in unsecured markets. 
Indeed, repo is the primary source of funding for such institutions.” Euroclear, Understanding Repo And The Repo 
Markets (March 2009) at p 15. Repo markets represent a large and important short-term source of capital for a range 
of shadow banking and non shadow banking activities (see, eg, European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), Trends, Risk and Vulnerabilities (No 1., 2013) (at p 35). Gorton and Metrick, “Who Ran on Repo?” (2012) 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series (Working Paper 18455)(“[B]ilateral repo is the home 
of hedge funds”) (at p 1); and Laura Valderrama, “Macroprudential Regulation under Repo Funding” (2015) 24 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 178, fn 4. 
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sophisticated―or at least wealthy―investors.33 In regulatory terms, it is important from the 
outset to distinguish between a hedge fund (which represents the legal entity in which the fund’s 
assets are held) and a hedge fund manager (that manages the fund’s assets and determines 
investment strategy). The distinction is important, because funds are typically based offshore (in 
tax efficient jurisdictions) and therefore beyond the reach of national regulators, whereas 
investment managers are typically based onshore and are increasingly subject to regulatory 
oversight.34   
While the sheer diversity of hedge funds makes it difficult to categorize either the funds 
themselves or their activities, one common approach is to identify certain core governance 
structures and investment techniques that are typically, albeit not universally, associated with the 
hedge fund industry:35 
Fig.  I36 
 
Typical hedge fund characteristics … 
 
But  ...  
managers may adopt a wide range of  
investment strategies (eg more active 
Some invest in illiquid assets 
which trade infrequently and not 
                                                          
33 In Goldstein v SEC, a decision of the DC Circuit, the Court described hedge funds as “any pooled investment 
vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to 
the public.” Goldstein v SEC, 451 F3d 873, 875 (DC Cir 2006) (quoting President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (1999) at p 1 (hereinafter 
PWG 1999 Report), available at (http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgefund.pdf) (quotation marks 
omitted).  
34 Globally, hedge funds’ assets under management totalled a record $2.7 trillion at the end of 2014, well above the 
pre-crisis peak in 2007 of around $2.4trillion. Although, London remains the second largest global centre for hedge 
funds managers, after New York, with a 17% share of the global hedge fund industry, London is by far the largest 
centre for hedge funds in Europe, with over two-thirds of European single manager hedge fund assets under 
management. See, TheCityUK, UK Fund Management: An Attractive Proposition For International Funds 
(November 2015) at 24-25. 
35 HFSB, Submission From the Hedge Funds Standards Board (HFSB) to the European Commission Public 
Consultation on Hedge Funds (April 2009). 
36 Adapted from the HFSB (http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10377/files/what_is_a_hedge_fund.pdf). 
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trading, engage in short selling) 
 
all managers short sell                   
 
managers may have an unlimited 
investment universe (eg derivatives) 
 
 
not all managers use derivatives, 
and an increasing number of 
“traditional” managers now use 
derivatives 
 
managers seek leverage   
 
not all employ leverage  
 
have a fee structure, which heavily 
incentivises good performance (eg 
emphasis on absolute rather than relative 
returns) 
some “long” only retail funds 
also adopt performance based 
compensation in their fee 
structures  
  
funds are often domiciled in offshore 
domiciles, such as the Cayman Islands, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands 
some hedge funds offer access to 
their investment management 
techniques via onshore 
structures  
 
offshore funds typically 
“serviced” by onshore managers, 
prime-brokers, custodians, 
administrators 
 
accessible only to institutional / 
sophisticated investor base (ie high 
investment limits)  
some “traditional” long only 
managers employ hedge fund 
type strategies (eg 130/30 funds 
use short selling)  
 
some hedge funds are accessible 
to retail investors (eg. if they are 
listed)  
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some jurisdictions allow retail 
access to hedge funds  
 
Accordingly, unlike traditional, retail forms of collective investment vehicle (such as mutual 
funds in the US and unit trusts in the UK), hedge fund managers tend to have a general licence 
(subject to the manager’s mandate from investors) to adopt a broad range of investment 
strategies (eg to invest both “long” and “short”); as well as an unlimited investment universe, 
such that managers can invest in an open-ended range of investments, including derivatives 
instruments. Hedge funds can also employ unlimited amounts of leverage,37 so that investment 
outcomes are magnified either in favour of the fund or against it.38  Furthermore, remuneration is 
routinely structured so as to align managers’ interests directly with those of their investors 
through co-investment by the manager in the fund, and (unlike retail investment fund managers) 
managers typically seek absolute returns rather than relative performance as judged against a set 
benchmark.39 Finally, fund partnership agreements often contain additional provisions, such as 
“high water marks” and “hurdle rates”, designed to provide further incentives for managers to 
                                                          
37 “Although leverage historically was obtained primarily by purchasing securities with borrowed money, today 
futures, options and other derivatives contracts may be a major source of leverage.” Staff Report to the SEC, 
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds (September, 2003) (hereinafter ‘SEC Staff Report’) at 37.  See also, 
FSA, Hedge Funds:  A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement (Discussion Paper 05/04) (hereinafter “FSA 
DP 05/04”) at 30-31. 
38 Thus, in the event that the investment strategy proves unsuccessful, not only does the fund sustain a direct loss on 
its investment, but it must also repay the money borrowed (plus any interest owing on it). 
39 Retail investment fund managers are typically benchmarked against market indices, such as the FTSE 100.  Thus, 
in a declining market the manager may claim success for the fund over which s/he has control even if the fund has 
lost money, provided it has outperformed the chosen benchmark (and vice versa).  By emphasising absolute returns, 
hedge fund managers seek to create profits irrespective of the movement in market indices.  Before the recent crash, 
a typical performance fee was in the region of 20% of the absolute return secured by the fund. Today, however, 
management fees are much more fluid. 
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grow the value of the fund. Essentially, these are predetermined thresholds which managers must 
beat before performance fees are paid.40  
The legal structure of a hedge fund—whether corporate, business trust, or limited 
partnership—as well as its location, is determined by a range of factors, critical amongst which is 
the desire to minimise investors’ liabilities, especially in relation to tax.41 A consequence of the 
use of any given structure is that although investors’ liability is limited to their initial investment, 
investors typically have only limited rights to management. In reality, it is usual for a 
combination of structures to be utilized, so as to “appeal to the broadest range of investors.”42 To 
a large extent, the term “hedge fund”—with its origins in the idea of “hedging one’s bets”—is a 
misnomer. Today, despite routinely deploying “hedging” strategies, hedge funds are largely 
speculative traders seeking “almost exclusively … to outperform the market average by superior 
security valuation and successful trading strategies.”43 As active and aggressive traders, hedge 
                                                          
40 SEC, Staff Report, supra n 37 at p 62. The function of a high water mark is to ensure that losses in previous years 
are made good before a performance fee can be paid. Consequently, if after making a profit in year one, the fund 
suffers a loss in year two before making a profit again in year three, the loss in year two needs to be made good 
before a new performance fees can be paid. Hurdle rates perform a similar function, inasmuch as they establish a 
minimum level of investment performance which must be exceeded before the fund’s adviser receives any 
performance fee. Typically the hurdle rate is pegged to some indice which reflects a supposed risk-free rate of 
return, such as the Treasury bill rate or the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). James Owen, The Prudent 
Investor’s Guide to Hedge Funds: Profiting from Uncertainty and Volatility (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2000) 
61. Since the investor could have invested in such “safe” investments, the manager must exceed the rate of return on 
investments of this type before any performance fee is paid.  
41 According to research conducted by the (now defunct) FSA, the “optimal location and form of each entity within 
the structure is frequently determined according to factors such as tax efficiency, proximity to major markets and 
appropriate regulatory regime”:  FSA, DP 05/04, supra, n 37, at pp 11-12. 
42 See, David Vaughan and Margaret Bancroft, “Structuring Issues for Hedge Funds” in The Capital Guide to 
Starting a Hedge Fund—A US Perspective 31, 32 (ISI Publications, 2002). 
43 G Connor and M Woo, “An Introduction to Hedge Funds” 
(<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/accountingAndFinance/pdf/ConnorIntroToHedgeFundVv3.pdf>) (p 26).  ‘Funds 
of funds’ hedge funds, invest in other hedge funds, the benefit of which is portfolio diversification. 
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funds are said to add liquidity and bring stability to markets, and, by exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities, to promote an efficient allocation of capital.44  
C.2 What are Repo Markets and How do Hedge Funds Use Them? 
It is widely recognized that the repo market is an important source of cash—and thus leverage—
for many hedge funds.45 As noted above, a repo is a form of secured—or collateralized—loan, 
whereby a cash borrower sells securities to a cash lender, but agrees to repurchase the same, or 
similar, securities at a (higher) price at some future date (usually somewhere between one day 
and one month later).46 The price difference between the sale of the securities and their 
repurchase (which includes a fee paid by the cash borrower for gaining access to the cash) is 
referred to as the “repo rate”. The collateral “posted” by the cash borrower (eg a hedge fund) 
represents a form of protection for the cash lender (eg an investment bank) in the event that the 
hedge fund becomes insolvent, or is otherwise unwilling to return the cash on the date agreed 
under the repo. In this context, it should be noted that repo collateral is not pledged; but rather it 
is sold (so that legal title is transferred) and then repurchased at a subsequent date (ie at 
maturity). Given that the cash lender acquires legal and beneficial title to the collateral, it has a 
proprietary right either to use the assets until they need to be returned, or, in the event that the 
cash buyer defaults on the repurchase agreement, to dispose of the assets to recover either some 
or all of the cash loaned.  
Furthermore, although a repo transfers full legal title of the collateralized assets to the 
cash lender for the full term of the repo, provided the cash borrower remains solvent, the cash 
                                                          
44 See HFSB’s Response to House of Lords European Union Committee Call for Evidence on the Directive on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers  (9 September, 2009) (at p 2). 
(http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10377/files/house_of_lords_eu_committee_call_for_evidence_final.pdf) 
45 Frank Hespeler and Christian Witt, “The Systemic Dimension of Hedge Fund Illiquidity and Prime Brokerage”  
(ESMA Working Paper No. 2, 2014) 1, p 4. 
46 This section draws on Euroclear, Understanding Repo And The Repo Markets, supra n 32.  
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lender is not exposed to the risk of any depreciation in the value of the assets during that period. 
That is to say, if the value of the posted collateral deteriorates in any way during the term of the 
repo, it is the cash borrower that bears the loss. The reason for this is because the cash borrower 
is contractually committed under the terms of the repo agreement, not only to repurchase the 
posted collateral on a future date, but to do so at a stipulated price (which includes the original 
sale price plus a fee for the use of the lender’s cash). By the same token, the cash borrower 
benefits from any increase in the value of the posted collateral, and retains the right to any 
income streams associated with the collateralized assets, such as coupon payments on bonds.   
In essence, this secured, or collateralized, aspect of the repo market helps to reduce the 
risk associated with lending, and thus makes it an attractive arrangement for risk-averse cash 
lenders. Since, in turn, this reduced risk leads to lower borrowing costs, it is not surprising that 
repos represent an important source of cheap finance and leverage for wholesale markets in 
general, and hedge funds in particular. Furthermore, because cash lenders acquire legal 
ownership of the posted collateral, this collateral can in fact be redeployed during the term of the 
repo agreement for the purposes of selling it to a third party, or, indeed, for different repoing 
purposes—thus converting a cash lender into a cash borrower. That said, a party utilising 
collateral in this way would need to repurchase the securities, or their equivalent, so as to be able 
to return the collateral to the original counterparty.  
Clearly the quality of the collateral posted is critical to the smooth operation of repo 
markets, and the identification and valuation of collateral acts as a key protection for cash 
lenders.47 The nature of the collateral to be exchanged by the parties is contractually agreed in 
advance. If excessive collateral is posted by the cash borrower, the borrower loses the 
                                                          
47 Richard Comotto, Shadow Banking and Repo (20 March 2012 “collateralized funding, prudently managed, 
reduces risk at source” (Comotto, 2012, at para 11.6). 
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opportunity to raise additional cash or engage in additional leverage. If, by contrast, insufficient 
collateral is posted, there is a risk that the cash lender will be “out of pocket” in the event that the 
borrower defaults on the agreement and the assets liquidated do not cover the cost of the cash 
loaned. Accordingly, it is crucial to both counterparties that initial collateral requirements are 
well-judged and that accurate valuations occur throughout the repo term. In practice, this 
involves the use of so-called “haircuts” and “initial margins”, whereby adjustments are made to 
the market value of the initial collateral posted so as “to reflect the risk that the cash realised by 
the liquidation of collateral securities may turn out to be less than the quoted market value of 
those securities.”48 In practice, haircuts and initial margins serve to over-collateralize the cash 
lender in a repo,49 such that the purchase price of a repo is less than the market value of the 
collateral posted.50 Furthermore, as well as any haircut or initial margin, the collateral posted 
must also be regularly valued. Any excess capital is then returned to the cash borrower, whereas 
any deterioration in the value of the collateral posted results in a “margin call”, whereby the 
borrower is required to make available additional suitable collateral to compensate for any 
deterioration in the value of the assets initially posted.  
In this context, a question which remains moot revolves around the extent to which 
haircuts and initial margin, as well as addressing collateral risk (ie the risk of a depreciation in 
the value of the collateral), also take into account counterparty credit risk (ie the risk that the 
                                                          
48 European Parliament, Shadow Banking – Minimum Haircuts on Collateral (Note, July 2013,  
IP/A/ECON/NT/2012-29) (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/507462/IPOL-
ECON_NT(2013)507462_EN.pdf). Haircuts are expressed as the percentage difference between the market value of 
the collateral security and the cash to be loaned through a repo (so a haircut of 5 % means that a security worth 100 
can be repoed out for 95). An initial margin is a percentage premium added to the market value of the security that 
is being offered as collateral in a repo or securities lending transaction. 
49 Haircuts are seen as potentially useful in restraining the build-up of excessive leverage by acting in a manner 
similar to reserve requirements on deposits. Ibid., para 1.6. 
50 However, “[w]here the probability of default and the likelihood of having to liquidate collateral are remote, no 
haircut/initial margin is typically imposed”: Richard Comotto,  Haircuts and Initial Margins in the Repo Market 
(ICMA’s European Repo Council, 8 February, 2012), para 3.8. 
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supplier of the collateral will default on the repo obligation, requiring the cash provider/collateral 
taker to liquidate the collateral, potentially at a loss). The evidence—such as it is—is equivocal. 
One recent Bank of International Settlement (BIS) study of repo market users—namely, banks, 
prime brokers, custodians, asset managers, pension funds and hedge funds—suggests that parties 
do increase haircuts or adjust available lines of credit in order to reflect increased counterparty 
risk.51 By contrast, a study by Fitch Ratings on US money market mutual funds (MMF) 
concludes that MMF haircuts are not particularly sensitive to the identity of repo 
counterparties.52 In assessing this evidence, Comotto, a leading commentator on repo 
transactions, concedes that special haircuts may feed into assessments of counterparty risk in 
exceptional circumstances—for example, “where … the counterparty is very large and/or market 
liquidity has already been critically impaired by a loss of confidence”.53 Nevertheless, he is 
sceptical about a more general link between special haircuts and counterparty credit risks. And in 
his work published under the auspices of the European Parliament, he concludes that while 
“counterparty credit risk is the primary concern of repo lenders” it would not be justified “to link 
haircuts directly to counterparty credit risk.”54 
                                                          
51 Bank of International Settlement (BIS), Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) Paper No.36 on The 
role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality (March 2010) (cited in Comotto, ibid., para 3.10). See 
also, Dang et al, who  note that haircuts for the same type of (structured security) collateral of the same 
rating differ between types of repo counterparty: Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmström, “Repo, Haircuts 
and Liquidity” (Working Paper, July 2011) (also cited in Comotto, ibid). 
52 Fitch Ratings, “Repo Emerges from the ‘Shadow’” (3 February, 2012) at p 3 (also cited in Comotto, ibid). This 
does, however, acknowledge that “determining whether haircuts are sensitive to counterparty risk is difficult to 
examine statistically, since the most active repo market borrowers are highly rated financial institutions, and it 
would be difficult to control for the quality of collateral when comparing haircuts across different institutions.” 
Nevertheless,  funds calibrate haircuts based on the potential price volatility of the collateral, rather than on the 
financial strength of the repo counterparty. See also European Parliament, Shadow Banking – Minimum Haircuts on 
Collateral, supra n 48: “[h]aircuts are not seen a primary risk management tool, because collateral is judged to be 
secondary in importance to counterparty credit risk.” (p 12). 
53 According to Comotto, in such situations in effect “counterparty credit risk feeds into market liquidity risk”, 
making it relevant to the size of haircuts. Supra n 50, para 3.16. 
54 European Parliament, supra n 48, para 1.3.  It should also be noted that the use of haircuts is also less widespread 
in Europe than in the US: ibid., para 1. 
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Although repo counterparties often choose to customise their own collateral management 
arrangements (ie bilateral repos), they may perceive both operational and economic advantages 
in outsourcing collateral management to neutral “triparty” agents, such as Euroclear Bank.55 In 
practice, however, most repo agreements involving hedge funds are bilateral,56 and, indeed, 
hedge funds are major providers of collateral assets for this market.57 In doing so, hedge funds 
typically acquire cash loans from prime brokers in return for posting some of their relatively 
illiquid assets (or securitised equivalents) as collateral. Often, prime brokers reuse—or 
rehypothecate—the posted collateral in repo and money markets. In the event that the seller (eg a 
hedge fund) fails to return the cash to the buyer (eg a prime broker), the buyer retains the 
collateral, the amount of which incorporates a margin for risk of default by the seller, for 
repayment. By repo-ing out their collateral in this way to prime brokers and other market 
dealiers, many hedge funds are heavily reliant on repo markets to fund their positions. This is 
particularly the case where the fund uses strategies which thrive on higher leverage – such as 
fixed income arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, and global macro.58 According to Singh, repo 
related financing was in the region of 27% and 32% of hedge fund mark-to-market positions 
                                                          
55 It should be noted, however, that a tri-party agent does not act as a trading venue (on which transactions are 
actually executed); or as a central clearing counterparty (CCP) (which becomes a seller to every buyer and a buyer 
to every seller and that nets opposite transactions with its counterparties); or even as a central securities depositary 
(CSD) (that is, a settlement venue where securities are delivered/received on behalf of the parties against 
receipt/delivery of cash). Instead, the tri-party agent’s role—in Europe at any rate—is limited to collateral 
management. That is to say, tri-party agents are involved in the selection of securities to be posted as collateral; the 
selection of any new collateral during the life span of the repo; and the issuing of various settlement instructions to a 
CSD. Richard Comotto, A Primer on Tri-party Repo(ICMA) (http://www.icmagroup.org/executive-
education/courses/the-icma-guide-to-best-practice-in-the-european-repo-market/a-primer-on-tri-party-repo/). In 
Europe tri-party repo constitutes about 10% of the market; whereas in the US it constitutes around 60% of the 
market: European Parliament, supra n 48, fn 18 (citing ICMA’s semi-annual European repo market survey). The 
difference “reflects in part the fact that tri-party repo services have been much cheaper in the US, because of greater 
economies of scale and a much simpler (if riskier) infrastructure”: Comotto, ibid. In the US ,significant strides have 
been made to remedy some of the riskier aspects of the US tri-party market which are associated with the so-called 
“unwind”. See, “US Reform of the Unwind” (Federal Reserve Bank of NY, 24 June , 2015 (Update on Tri-Party 
Repo Infrastructure Reform (https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2015/0624_2015.html)).  
56 Valderrama, supra n 32 . 
57 Supra n 45, p 4 (and sources cited therein). 
58 M Singh, “Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications” (2011, IMF Working Paper No. 11/256) 1, 
p 6. 
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(after including leverage in these strategies) in 2007 and 2010,59  while in the FCA’s 2015 Hedge 
Fund Survey, it was found that “[r]epo and reverse repo transactions dominate financial 
borrowings, and remain the preferred tool by Macro funds.”60  
There are many motivations for transactions of this nature, but all are rooted in ex ante 
self-interest. That is to say, both parties—and, indeed, all other parties in subsequent transactions 
based on the initial agreement—envisage some form of commercial benefit arising from the 
arrangement, such as liquidity management, hedging, or benefits from short sales. More broadly, 
such transactions are widely seen as helping to promote market completeness, through 
improvements in price discovery and enhancements to market liquidity—and, in doing so, to 
help facilitate financial markets’ broader task of channelling funds from savers to borrowers. Yet 
while it is widely believed that repo markets offer a number of broader economic and social 
benefits, there are increasing regulatory concerns about the fragility or otherwise of repo markets 
and their ability to disrupt intermediation chains within the shadow banking system more 
generally. The next section traces these concerns by identifying key vulnerabilities within repo 
markets which indicate that hedge funds have the capacity to trigger and subsequently transmit 
systemic risk notwithstanding the fact they are different from banks. In order to explore these 
ideas, I begin by addressing financial stability and systemic risk in general terms before moving 
on to consider ways in which the involvement of hedge funds in repo transactions can give rise 
to repo runs that adversely affect the workings of the financial system. 
  
D. REGULATORY CONCERNS 
                                                          
59 Ibid., 
60 FCA, Hedge Fund Survey (Nov, 2015), p 6. 
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D.1. Financial Stability and Systemic Risk 
 
A central concern—if not the central concern—for financial regulators the world over is to 
ensure financial stability. The significance of this policy goalis underscored by the impact that 
the GFC has had on both global financial markets, and on the “real” economics of jurisdictions 
most exposed to it. Crockett defines financial stability as a state of affairs where:61 
 
“the capacity of financial institutions and markets to efficiently mobilise savings, provide 
liquidity and allocate  investment is maintained unimpaired [and where there is an] 
absence of strains that curtail the intermediation function of the financial system, such as 
the failure of the banking payments system.”  
 
According to Crockett:62 
 
“[f]inancial stability can be consistent with the failure of individual institutions, and with 
fluctuations of prices in markets for financial assets. The failure of individual institutions 
is of concern only if it leads … to an impairment of the basic intermediation role of the 
financial system at large. And asset price volatility is of concern only if it leads to a 
severe misallocation of capital.” 
 
                                                          
61 Andrew Crockett, “Strengthening Financial Stability” in Philip Booth and David Currie (eds) The Regulation of 
Financial Markets (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2003) p 44 https://iea.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/upldbook214pdf.pdf.  
62 Ibid.  
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Most commentators conceptualise the goal of financial stability in terms of the absence of 
financial crises. Howard Davies, the former Chairman of the UK’s now defunct Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), defines a “financial crisis” as:63 
 
“a situation in which confidence in financial institutions or markets generally is lost, or 
where there is an actual or a serious risk of collapse in the whole financial system which 
would generate collateral damage even for savers and investors who are not directly 
linked to the institution or institutions that are the source of the crisis.” 
 
Recent events demonstrate that even largely stable financial centres such as the US and the EU 
remain vulnerable to “financial stability events”, and that the cost of these “systemic failures” are 
significant not only in terms of restoring the financial system to good health, but also in terms of 
lost output, higher unemployment, and social dislocation in the countries affected. 
 
D.2. Hedge Funds and “Repo Runs”—Triggering and Transmitting Systemic Risk 
 
Orthodox economic thinking posits that systemic risk concerns do not typically extend beyond 
the realm of retail banking to other financial market players such as hedge funds.64 What is more, 
it is generally accepted by regulators and academic commentators that—for a number of 
                                                          
63 Howard Davies, “Managing Financial Crises” in Booth and Currie (eds),  ibid ., p 26 (emphasis added) . 
64 Indeed, some commentators even seek to draw a distinction between an “unsterilized” bank run (which is viewed 
as problematic, since it may be the source of systemic risk) and what is known as a “flight to quality” (which, 
despite inflicting losses on a weak deposit taking institution, serves the purpose of redistributing bank reserves to 
better quality institutions without causing any adverse knock on effects): Richard J Herring, Review of Richard S 
Dale, International Banking Deregulation: The Great Banking Experiment (Blackwell, 1992) in (1993) 48(4) 
Journal of Finance 1153, p 1154; George G Kaufman, “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” 
[1994] Journal of Financial Services Research 123, p 140-141; and Kevin Dowd “The Case For Financial Laissez-
Faire” (1996) 106 (May) The Economic Journal 679, pp 682-683 
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reasons—many of the activities and characteristics of hedge funds are far removed from 
traditional conceptions of banking.65 To begin with, unlike retail bank depositors who have a 
right to instant liquidity, hedge fund investors are prevented from withdrawing funds on demand 
as a result of the widespread use of redemption restrictions. Furthermore, ordinarily, hedge funds 
are less highly-leveraged than banks and typically hold positions which, it is claimed, can, if 
necessary, be unwound relatively easily in secondary markets. Finally, notwithstanding the 
existence of “fund of funds” hedge funds, hedge funds do not generally deal directly with retail 
investors. Accordingly, many of the features which have caused banks to be regarded as special 
(and thus require the use of liquidity and capital requirements and the provision of lender of last 
resort support (for banking entities) and deposit protection (for depositors)) do not apply to 
hedge funds. 
 However, notwithstanding the obvious differences between retail banks and hedge funds, 
and long-standing attempts by the hedge fund sector to deflect regulatory attention on this basis, 
regulators are increasingly targeting shadow banking activities in general, and repo transactions 
in particular. It is suggested here that hedge funds have the capacity to trigger and transmit 
systemic risk in two key ways. First, from within the shadow banking system itself—for 
example, in the form of a “run on repo”, which adversely affects not only those parties directly 
implicated, but spills over to other shadow banking entities which find it difficult to refinance (ie 
“rollover”) their short term positions. And, secondly, as a result of the adverse effects of a “repo 
run” on retail banks’ balance sheets66—whether directly (ie following on from the provision by 
such banks of credit lines to hedge funds, or as a result of counterparty exposures), or indirectly 
(as a consequence of retail banks’ exposures to other shadow banking entities’ losses). In this 
                                                          
65 See for example, the Turner Review, supra n 20, p 7. 
66 FSA, Assessing The Possible Sources of Systemic Risk From Hedge Funds:  A Report on the Findings of the 
FSA’s Hedge Fund Survey and Hedge Fund as Counterparty Survey (Feb, 2012) p 3. 
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latter context, as we have already seen, because banks’ liabilities are repayable on demand, and 
their assets are typically comparatively illiquid, banks are vulnerable to “runs”—which, in turn, 
can adversely affect other viable, but potentially illiquid banks. As a consequence of the 
complexities and interconnections evident in modern financial arrangements, disruptions within 
the financial system—whether originating and remaining within the shadow banking system, or, 
more worryingly, spilling over to the traditional banking system—are likely to result in a severe 
contraction in the provision of credit to borrowers and/or disruption to the payments system. In 
the event that socially desirable projects go unfunded, economic output and tax revenues are 
likely to fall, and unemployment and government borrowing to rise.67 
  
D.2.1.   Systemic Risk:  Within the Shadow Banking System 
 
The use of collateralization in repo arrangements represents a routine and highly effective ex 
ante method by which a cash lender may protect itself. Consequently, in the vast majority of 
cases, both the cash lender and the cash borrower’s interests will be fully aligned, and their 
respective concerns fully allayed, as a result of the collateralization and margining arrangements 
adopted under the repo agreement. This is particularly the case where the collateral used is 
highly liquid—eg government bonds.68 
However, the use of collateralization, haircuts on collateral, and margin calls are by no 
means a “fail-safe”; rather, under conditions of market stress, readjustments in collateral 
                                                          
67 To the extent that bank-dependent borrowers cannot access alternative sources of funding, investment and 
economic activity will be curtailed until new relationships are formed and information recreated: John Kambhu, Til 
Schuermann, and Kevin J Stiroh, “Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation and Systemic Risk” (2007) December 
Economic Policy Review 1, pp 7-9. 
68 It is estimated that around 80% of collateral in the European repo market is government securities: ICMA 
http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-
asked-questions-on-repo/34-was-a-run-on-repo-the-cause-of-the-financial-crisis-in-2007/. 
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arrangements have the capacity to trigger “bank-like” runs—so-called “repo runs”—which 
disrupt the smooth operation of the shadow banking system, and, potentially, the traditional 
banking sector, too. The concept of a “repo run” originating outside the traditional banking 
sector is rooted in the identification of a key vulnerability which underpins the intermediation 
arrangement with which repos are typically associated: namely, that short term collateralized 
loans are liable to be highly unstable during times of market stress.69 As a result, any threat to the 
collateral backing the expansion in credit volume created by the repo, or, indeed, to the solvency 
of either counterparty, can help to generate—and, through interconnecting chains of complex and 
potentially opaque transactions, augment and subsequently transmit—systemic risk.70  
Even where the collateralized assets backing a repo are widely regarded as being of high 
quality, shock events can still adversely affect asset prices and reduce the value of the posted 
collateral. Unlike the assets traded in many other markets, the fundamental value of a financial 
instrument is difficult to determine. This is because the value of a financial instrument today 
depends, inter alia, upon its expected future value.71 In determining where and how much to 
invest, investors may be influenced by data that is unrelated to the future value of an asset. An 
example of such “noise trading” occurs where investors, buoyed by a wave of market sentiment, 
continue to buy shares even after the market has experienced sustained price rises and over-shot 
its equilibrium price,72 or continue to sell unaware that the bottom of the market has already been 
reached. Furthermore, the means by which equilibrium prices are maintained in the financial 
                                                          
69 Antoine Martin, David Skeie, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, “Repo Runs” (2014) 27(4) The Review of 
Financial Studies 957; Gorton and Metrick, supra n 6; Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin, and Michael Walker, “The 
Tri-party Repo Market Before the 2010 Reforms” (2010) Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Staff Report No 477). 
70 ESMA, supra n 32.  
71 Crockett, supra, n 61, p 49; and Kern Alexander, Rahule Dhumale, and John Eatwell, Global Governance of 
Financial Systems (OUP, 2006) p 253. 
72 For example, in relation to dot-com stock. 
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sector operates in a way that is significantly different from other sectors of the economy.73 
Somewhat presciently, as Crockett explains, as long ago as 2003:74 
[i]n the case of credit … an expansion in supply can, for a time, strengthen economic activity and boost 
asset prices—and, by improving the balance sheet position of both borrowers and lenders, it can sustain 
further increases in the supply of credit. Excess capacity and risk can build up unnoticed …. These 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the leverage in financial intermediation can give rise to fragile 
balance sheets structures. The sudden and sometimes indiscriminate retrenchment of suppliers of funds can 
cause institutions and markets to be starved of liquidity, intensifying price declines and impairing the 
functioning of markets. 
Shocks which adversely affect the value of repo collateral can cause cash lenders to issue margin 
calls on existing repos, or to increase haircuts on new repo agreements. The upshot of such 
adjustments would be to cause leveraged hedge funds to provide more assets to cover any 
“calls,” and sell more of their assets to generate much needed liquidity. In all likelihood, 
however, asset sales by hedge funds would increase the risk of more widespread panic-driven 
“fire-sales”. In such circumstances, assets would “trade at prices far below value in best use, 
causing severe losses to [hedge fund] sellers.”75 Furthermore, increasing the supply of a 
collateralized asset at a critical time, and thus potentially aggravating price falls, could trigger a 
self-reinforcing downwards spiral—a so-called “death spiral”—and set in motion yet further 
margin calls76 and more extreme haircuts.77 More generally, where other financial institutions 
hold similar assets classes, and are required to “mark them to market”, additional downward 
                                                          
73 Crockett, supra, n 61, p 50. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics” (2011) 25 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 29, p 30. 
76 “[L]enders will increase the margins they require from borrowers if they anticipate having to seize collateral and 
sell it in a disorderly fashion”: Martin Oehmke, “Liquidating Illiquid Collateral” (2014) 149 Journal of Economic 
Theory 183, p.184. 
77 Gorton and Metrick, supra n 6.  
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pressure is likely to be exerted on the market price of the assets in question. Any consequent 
unwillingness amongst other market participants to absorb the risks associated with buying and 
retaining such assets would, in turn, reduce the availability of reliable prices for collateral 
valuation and serve to exacerbate price falls. In the face of concerns about the ongoing quality of 
certain types of collateral (and counterparty credit risk)—as happened at the onset of the GFC—
cash lenders would be incentivized to sever credit lines and hoard liquidity, with the result that 
hedge funds would encounter difficulties in “rolling over” their short-term borrowing, 
notwithstanding a willingness to collateralize it. Starved of liquidity, the effect in the shadow 
banking sector would resemble a “run” in the traditional banking sector—but without the “back 
stop” of official liquidity support. Added pressures would be exerted where hedge funds allowed 
their posted collateral to be rehypothecated, such that their prime broker could repledge the 
collateral in a number of different repo transactions.78 Collateral “velocity” or “churn” facilitates 
price discovery and also leverage, but where this leverage is acquired in compex and opaque 
ways it could also render the underlying collateral highly sensitive to price declines.79 What is 
more, any uncertainy over the ownership of the collateral rehypothecated could intensify price 
declines, as hedge fund borrowers sought to adjust and protect their positions.      
All of the above problems are compounded where the assets that are subject to higher 
haircuts or additional margin calls are relatively illiquid and/or difficult to value. According to 
Valukas, “[i]lliquid collateral requires longer time periods for sale at more uncertain prices, with 
time periods and prices dependent on the type of collateral, the amount of collateral to sell and 
prevailing market conditions”.80 Since illiquid instruments are infrequently traded and have no 
                                                          
78 Lutrell, David, Rosenblum, Harvey, and Thies, Jackson, “Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking” 
(2012) Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Staff Paper No 18) p 35; and, generally, M Singh, supra n 58. 
79 Lutrell et al, ibid. 
80 Cited in Oehmke, supra n 76,  p 184. 
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public screen price, the fact of selling such instruments is almost certain to adversely affect their 
price. In potentially febrile markets, this would further accentuate ongoing uncertainty with 
regard to asset prices. Furthermore, leverage—which is a traditional hallmark of much hedge 
fund activity—would have the capacity to amplify such problems, by making it even more 
difficult for hedge funds to  fund their positions and rollover their debt. 
Similar problems also arise where doubts surface with regard to the actual credit-
worthiness of a hedge fund as a counterparty (and its ability to conclude the repo), rather than in 
relation to the quality of the fund’s collateral. In such circumstances, cash lenders are likely to be 
tempted to “rush to the exits” to liquidate the collateral that has been “posted” in advance of 
other lenders motivated to do exactly the same thing.81 As with hedge funds selling assets to 
generate liquidity, a glut of such collateral would depress prices further and, in all likelihood, 
exert self-reinforcing downward pressure on asset prices. Again, where the collateral held by 
lenders is illiquid/or hard to value—or where a leveraged hedge fund (or group of funds) defaults 
“while holding positions that are large relative to the markets in which they have invested”—
lenders seeking to offload such assets are more likely to hasten price declines by virtue of their 
attempts to sell.82 In turn, this increases the prospect of cash lending counterparties—some of 
which may be systemically important entities in their own right, or linked to systemically 
important institutions—sustaining heavy losses.83 While, ideally, lenders would prefer to unwind 
their positions slowly over time, in practice this is likely to prove extremely difficult for two 
main reasons: first, lending counterparties to hedge funds are unlikely to be able to unwind 
positions on a gradual basis because of the existence of balance sheet constraints on, for 
                                                          
81 “Since most nonbank financial institutions rely heavily on repo financing, understanding the dynamics of 
liquidations of repo collateral is critical in gauging the impact and repercussions of defaults by financial 
institutions.” Oehmke, ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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example, capital, equity, or leverage;84 and, secondly, competition among holders of illiquid 
collateral is likely to incentivise such lenders to sell the illiquid assets quickly. As Oehmke 
points out “[w]hen the demand curve for the collateral asset is downward-sloping, competing 
sellers have an incentive to sell before other sellers drive down the price [even further].”85 
Delays by lenders may not only result in breaches of their balance sheet constraints, but may also 
result in lower asset recovery prices, as competitors seek to liquidate assets in advance of 
“crowded trades”, where multiple sellers rush to the exit at the same time.86 
At a general level, all of these market adjustments—both in terms of adjustments to 
collateral (eg increased margin calls and more extreme haircuts) and adjustments to 
accommodate increased counterparty risk (eg the withdrawal of credit lines and the need to sell 
collateral swiftly where the credit-worthiness of a hedge fund counterparty becomes suspect)—
are likely to be motivated by factors that seem individually rational to the parties directly 
affected. Nevertheless, there is a clear risk that, at a collective level, such individual attempts at 
self-preservation may generate a form of collective folly which serves merely to exacerbate the 
original problem. The result of this disjuncture between private and public interests is an 
outcome which may render the entire shadow banking network vulnerable to shocks.87 That is to 
say, while losses would initially be borne by a hedge fund (or group of funds), and any adversely 
affected counterparties, in all likelihood these losses would not lie where they fell, but would 
spill over—either directly or indirectly—to other interconnected entities within the shadow 
banking system, or in time to the traditional banking sector. 
                                                          
84 Ibid., at p 188. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., at p 185. 
87 “[T]he creditor structure in repo lending involves a fundamental tradeoff between risk sharing and inefficient 
‘rushing to the exits’ by competing sellers of collateral after a default.” Ibid., p 184. 
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D.2.2.    Systemic Risk:  Within the Traditional Banking System 
 
In addition to the transmission of systemic risk within the shadow banking sector through their 
involvement in repo runs, hedge funds are also capable of transmitting systemic risk as a result 
of repo arrangements which adversely impact on banks’ balance sheets. This may arise from 
banks’ direct or indirect exposure to the collapsed hedge fund (or group of funds), or asset class 
in which a fund (or group of funds) is highly active, the value of which has significantly 
deteriorated.88  
 Retail banks may be directly exposed to hedge fund repo operations through, for 
example, the provision of direct credit lines for liquidity purposes, or as a result of counterparty 
exposures in either exchange-based or over-the-counter (OTC) trades.89 Shocks in relation to any 
of these trades could cause banks to sustain heavy losses and set in motion a domino effect, such 
that other systemically important financial institutions are in turn affected through “asset price 
adjustments, liquidity strains, and increased market uncertainty.”90 Where vulnerable institutions 
are deemed “too big to fail”, costly public sector bailouts could ensue. 
                                                          
88 See, Kambhu et al, supra n 67, pp 7-9. 
89 ICMA: “[S]ince the crisis … repo has reportedly been attracting smaller [retail] banks” (< 
http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-
asked-questions-on-repo/5-who-are-the-main-users-of-the-repo-market/>). Furthermore, the collapse of the Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) Hedge Fund in the summer of 1998 and the timely intervention of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York illustrates all too clearly the problems which arise when a failed hedge fund has an 
adverse effect on otherwise healthy institutions, in particular banks, many of which had made loans to LTCM and 
thus enabled it to take on highly leveraged positions. Although the exact origins of the LTCM fund debacle have 
been variously described, the failure of the fund’s quantitative models to cope with irregular market movements 
caused it to sustain heavy losses—a problem that was compounded by the fund’s unusually high degree of leverage. 
The Federal Reserve orchestrated a $3.6 billion private sector recapitalisation of LTCM on the basis that a forced 
liquidation could adversely affect market prices and induce heavy losses for those both directly and indirectly 
concerned—many of whom were major Wall Street Investment Banks. 
90 Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, (Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 
2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia May 16, 2006). 
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 Retail banks are, however, more likely to be indirectly exposed to shocks which emanate 
from hedge fund activities in repo markets. For example, investment banks acting as prime 
brokers, typically execute trades, hold hedge fund assets on margin account, grant credit, and 
provide risk management, clearance and settlement services on behalf of hedge funds. To the 
extent that an investment bank, or other exposed counterparty to an ailing fund, is unable to fulfil 
its commitments to a retail bank, the latter is indirectly exposed to risks originating in, and 
transmitted by, the hedge fund sector. 
 
D.3. Counterparty Risk Controls and the Limits of Market Discipline 
 
It might, of course, be countered that the risk of a repo run as outlined above has been overstated, 
and that post-crisis regulation—both direct regulation targeted at hedge funds themselves, but 
also, and more significantly for the puposes of this section, indirect regulation aimed at hedge 
fund counterparties and improving market transparency (such as as the recent Securities 
Financing Transactions Regulation (“SFTR” ))—already operates as a sufficient constraint to 
mitigate any putative remaining systemic risks. In relation to reliance upon self-help market 
mechanisms, the argument is that cash lending counterparties can credibly mitigate any 
remaining exposure to counterparty risk by deploying conventional counterparty risk controls, 
such as limiting agreements to entities with good credit ratings, calculating and monitoring credit 
exposures, setting and adhering to risk limits, and so on. In essence, such self-help ex ante 
controls are strongly associated with the benefits derived from market discipline, where well-
managed hedge funds are rewarded with more business, and those that are poorly-managed are 
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penalized.91 In this way, the interplay of market forces is said to eliminate—or at least reduce—
the type of suboptimal behaviour that can give rise to systemic risk.92 The significance of 
identifying and assessing counterparty risk—rather than simply relying upon collateralization 
arrangements—is explained by Comotto:93  
 
“[c]areful selection of counterparties is vital to the performance of repo. This is because the value of even 
the best assets will fluctuate and the liquidation of collateral in response to an event of default can be 
delayed by unexpected operational and legal problems. Moreover, collateralisation does not change the 
probability of default of a counterparty, so collateral taken from risky counterparties is likely to be tested 
by a default and may turn out to be worth less than expected. Consequently, collateral should be treated 
only as insurance against the default of the seller, not as a substitute for his credit risk. This means that the 
primary exposure in a repo remains counterparty credit risk. 
 
Accordingly, it is widely recognised that collateralization is, ipso facto, an insufficient basis 
upon which to ensure that repo transactions are privately beneficial while, at the same time, 
promoting the public good. 
 Yet reliance upon existing direct and indirect regulation as supplemented by market 
discipline in the form of private counterparty risk controls is unlikely to prove an especially 
robust method of ensuring that private and public interests are sufficiently aligned. The 
feasibility of this type of market discipline is premised upon the existence of standard neo-
classical assumptions about economically rational motivation, competitive market conditions, 
                                                          
91 Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M Pacces, “The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs Indirect Regulation” 
(2015) 6 William & Mary Business Law Review 183, p 206. 
92 “[S]ystemic risk . . . is by definition an externality that internal procedures do not encompass and is not accounted 
for in the marketplace.” Alexander et al, supra n 71, p 260. 
93 ICMA, supra n 89, “Question 15: Is repo riskless?”. 
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and the availability of full information and the absence of transaction costs.94 Although it is 
widely accepted—even within the hedge fund sector itself—that various post-GFC regulatory 
measures  have helped to remedy some of these problems, significant market failures are 
nevertheless sure to remain.  
 In large measure, these failures arise because of the highly complex, opaque, and largely 
bespoke nature of many of the trades that are undertaken, as well as the speed with which market 
positions can change.95 For example, prime broker counterparties—as well as other entities that 
“service” hedge funds—will continue to find it difficult to assess hedge fund-trading strategies 
and asset valuations, especially in relation to hard-to-value illiquid instruments. These 
difficulties exist not only in relation to making adjustments to haircuts and subsequent margins 
calls, but also in relation to assessing counterparty risk more generally. Insofar as hedge fund 
repo business becomes an ever-increasing source of revenue for counterparties, there will exist 
an incentive—at least in the short run—in taking a more relaxed approach to assessing 
counterparty risk. In other words, reliance upon counterparties, and other credit providers, to 
control hedge funds’ leverage and risk might well be misplaced if these entities are first to 
benefit from a fund’s high levels of leverage and potentially overly risky—albeit profitable—
trading strategies.96 
 Furthermore, to the extent that hedge funds receive repo financing from a number of 
different counterparties, collective action problems are almost certain to arise (especially where 
                                                          
94 See John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (OUP 1993) p 132. See also, Timothy F Geithner, 
“Hedge Funds and Derivatives and the Implications for the Financial System” (Speech: 15th September, 2006) 
(www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060914) (“the effectiveness of market discipline in 
constraining the risk-taking behaviour of firms may, however, be compromised by the presence of market failures.”) 
(p 4). 
95 FSB, Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues (Interim Report of the FSB 
Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos, 27 April 2012) (p 14). 
96 Paolo Robotti,  “Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:  Explaining the Debate at the Financial Stability Forum” 
(May 2006) (http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/dp560.pdf ) p 23.   
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individual counterparty exposure to the fund is relatively small). In such circumstances, 
counterparties will prefer that the full cost of any due diligence and risk assessment of a fund’s 
risk profile be borne by others rather than themselves. That is to say, counterparties have an 
incentive to “free ride” on the due diligence and risk monitoring efforts of others. The end result 
is a general tendency for firms to economise on counterparty risk assessment and an overall 
erosion of the disciplinary effects of private monitoring. This collective underinsurance in 
relation to risk assessment and underinvestment in the infrastructure and policies that help to 
promote financial stability, mean that it is likely—and perhaps even inevitable—that some hedge 
fund repo risks will continue to be mispriced. And in turn, this mispricing has potentially serious 
implications for the stability of financial markets more generally. 
 Accordingly, the continuing presence of serious informational problems of the type 
mentioned above, as well as the limitations of economically rational decision-making, makes it 
unlikely that the operation of market constraints in the form of counterparty risk controls over 
the hedge fund sector will operate in such a way as to ensure that private interests are fully, or 
even adequately, aligned with the public good. Naturally, it does not follow that mandatory 
regulatory measures  addressing such problems will necessarily lead to a more socially desirable 
state of affairs than the status quo, since the costs of formal regulatory intervention could turn 
out to be greater than any ensuing benefits.97 However, in the absence of reliable empirical 
evidence which demonstrates that this is the case (evidence which is unlikely to be forthcoming), 
the argument in favour of mandatory regulatory intervention is at least as strong as that in 
support of the current state of affairs. 
 
                                                          
97 The costs of regulatory intervention include, but are not limited to, moral hazard problems, enforcement problems, 
overregulation and scope for regulatory capture. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
 
Today, repo transactions occupy a central place in, and are widely seen as representing an 
indispensable facet of, the modern global shadow banking system. Here, the claim is not that any 
given repo transaction inevitably generates economic benefits, but that fully functioning repo 
markets have a general tendency to do so. Specifically, repo markets are said to play an 
important role in helping to distribute government securities, and to facilitate the mobilization of 
“wholesale capital funding required by retail banks and other lenders financing the real 
economy.”98 More significantly for present purposes, bilateral repo markets have become a 
primary source of funding for leveraged entities, such as hedge funds.99 As the profile of the 
shadow banking sector has grown, regulators have now begun to turn their attention to the role of 
hedge funds in the context of so-called “repo runs”. Although concerns about “runs” have long 
occupied the minds of central bankers and regulators the world over, until relatively recently it 
was widely assumed that such events were confined to the traditional banking sector. Yet, as the 
material presented above has sought to demonstrate, hedge fund involvement in repo markets can 
give rise to situations where private and public interests are seriously misaligned—in particular, 
where, in the face of a sudden collapse of asset prices and the collateral backing repo 
transactions, hedge funds’ consequent search for liquidity serves to trigger and subsequently 
transmit systemic risk at significant public cost. In developing these ideas, the chapter has sought 
to challenge those claims which suggest that hedge funds are not a serious threat to financial 
stability, and to take issue with a body of opinion which seeks to downplay or even dismiss 
                                                          
98 Comotto,  supra  n 1. 
99 “Repo is particularly attractive to institutions that are already highly leveraged (eg securities firms and hedge 
funds), who would otherwise find it expensive and/or difficult to borrow additional funds in unsecured markets. 
Indeed, repo is the primary source of funding for such institutions.” Euroclear, Understanding Repo And The Repo 
Markets (March 2009) p 15. 
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concerns—both in the context of repo and, indeed, more generally—relating to hedge funds’ 
systemic capabilities. Significantly, the validity or otherwise of these claims has an important 
bearing on establishing a case for additional regulatory scrutiny, extending beyond current 
regulatory measures directed at the hedge fund sector more generally. 
Unsurprisingly, the prospect of any additional regulatory oversight over and above the 
status quo, is not one that the hedge fund industry is likely to welcome with any degree of 
alacrity. Although much of the industry’s anti-regulation posturing can be attributed to the 
sector’s long-standing contrarian tradition towards both financial markets and financial market 
regulators, in more recent times it has been shaped by creation of narrative about the benign role 
of hedge funds during the crisis and thereafter. In this context, apologists are quick to claim that 
notwithstanding the fact that a number of hedge fund were engulfed by the crisis,100 none 
involved the provision of public support, and few, if any, of these failures actually caused 
collateral damage to the broader financial system. This narrative has been further bolstered by 
the findings of a number of influential post-GFC reports which largely exonerated hedge funds 
as a major cause of the market disruption,101 in turn, indirectly helping to propagate the myth that 
hedge funds were in fact victims of the crisis—more “sinned against than sinning”.  
                                                          
100 For example, two Bear Sterns hedge funds collapsed in the summer of 2007, at in and around the same time that 
London-based Cheyne Capital Management LLP announced it was writing off  €400 million from a hedge fund that 
had investments in subprimemortgage-backed securities: Robert Stowe England, “Anatomy of a Meltdown” (2007) 
67(13) Mortgage Banking, 38–53. In August 2007, the largest bank in France, BNP Paribas SA, froze redemptions 
from three funds with investments in US subprime-mortgage-backed securities rated AAA and AA.” Ibid. 
Furthermore, in March 2008, Citigroup injected $1 billion into a number of is hedge funds that were hemorrhaging 
cash. Within six months, US taxpayers injected billions of dollars into Citigroup to prevent a systemic crisis: 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) Response to SEC’s Proposed 
rule on Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity 
Trading Advisors on Form PF (https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-11/s70511-28.pdf)) (at p 3). 
101 See, for example, the Turner Review (supra n 20) and the EU High Level Group on Financial Supervision 
(February 2009) (the so-called “de Larosière Report”) which both suggested that in so far as hedge funds were 
implicated in the crisis, they did not help to cause it.  
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However, looking back to hedge fund involvement in the events of the GFC and its 
aftermath, this narrative turns out to be a selective and tendentious reading of recent financial 
history. Leaving aside the fate of individual hedge funds during the market turmoil—and it is, of 
course, noteworthy that the implosion of two Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds in July 2007 
were harbingers of the disruption that was eventually to ensue—the industry as a whole has 
routinely failed to face up fully to the implications of its involvement in modern, interdependent, 
and highly interconnected global financial markets. In this respect, not only did the hedge fund 
sector benefit from the privatization of financial gains in the run up to and during the crisis, but it 
also benefited from the more general socialization of losses—in the forms of bailouts and de 
facto nationalisations of a range of financial entities—which fostered trading opportunities that 
otherwise would not have been available. Moreover, it is argued that the socialization of these 
losses helped to disguise any collateral damage hedge fund activity might otherwise have caused 
the financial system more generally had public support not been forthcoming. Accordingly, 
claims to special immunity from further regulatory oversight based on the fact that no individual 
hedge fund received public support directly are, it is suggested, neither “here nor there”— 
especially  in view of the fact that the sector as a whole benefited indirectly from the support that 
was provided, much of which was necessary in order to stave off even wider contagion.    
Looking forward, the GFC has irrevocably altered the terms of debate upon which 
regulators and policy makers’ approach the regulation of financial markets and institutions—and, 
rightly so, given evidence of the existence of endemic market failures across virtually the whole 
financial services spectrum. If the experience of the crisis has taught us anything, it is that: 
• financial markets are not as robust as politicians, market players, and regulators had 
previously assumed; 
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• financial markets are much more interconnected than at any previous stage in history, 
spilling over from one interconnected sub-sector to another, and, indeed, from one 
jurisdiction to another;  
• problems in financial markets impact adversely on the “real” economy through the 
loss of jobs and the risk of more general economic stagnation; and 
• in the event of large-scale systemic collapses, and irrespective of how these are 
triggered and transmitted, politicians and policy makers have little choice other than 
to deploy taxpayer money to bail-out ailing institutions (albeit that there remains 
scope for debate with regard to when, the extent to which, such bail-outs should 
occur). 
In view of these considerations, all private institutions—hedge funds included—with the 
capacity to trigger and transmit risks which have potentially damaging public consequences, 
merit ever-closer regulatory scrutiny.   
Admittedly, this may only provide a context within which additional regulatory scrutiny 
is prima facie justified, rather than inform us as to which measures are in fact appropriate. 
Nevertheless, as an important facet of shadow banking in general and securities financing 
transactions in particular, regulators now have repo markets and repo participants firmly in their 
“gun sights”. Furthermore, notwithstanding the hedge fund sector’s traditional recalcitrance in 
the face of ever greater regulatory intrusion, funds must now face up to the fact that they deserve 
to get caught up in the resulting “crossfire”.  
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